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Note
The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of
White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys Under
the Joint Defense Doctrine
Matthew D. Forsgren
You're putting bad guys in jail. You're trying to get every edge you can
on those people who are devising increasingly more intricate schemes
to rip off the public, hiring the best lawyers, providing the best de-
fenses. So you're constantly pushing the edge of the envelope out to see
if you can get an edge for the prosecution.
Richard Thornburgh'
A federal court may disqualify a criminal defense attorney
from participating in a case when the attorney has a potential
conflict of interest.2 Although fatal conflicts of interest arise in a
1. Jim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers; Aggres-
sive Tactics Put Fairness at Issue, WASH. PoST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al (quoting
former United States Attorney General).
2. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (affording lower
courts "broad latitude" in disqualification decisions). A disqualification order
bars an attorney from playing any role in defending her erstwhile client. See,
e.g., United States v. Moscony, 697 F. Supp. 888, 894-95 (E.D. Penn. 1988),
aff'd, 927 F.2d 742, 748-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991). The
order also applies to any member of the attorney's law firm. See, e.g., United
States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 241 (M.D. La. 1989), affid, 983 F.2d 1063
(5th Cir. 1993).
This Note addresses the issue of attorney disqualification in criminal cases.
Federal courts, however, also disqualify attorneys who suffer client-related con-
flicts of interest in civil cases. See generally Steven A. Goldberg, The Former
Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anom-
aly, 72 Mn-N. L. REv. 227, 228 (1987) (stating that civil disqualification motions
had become "infamous" by 1984). The applicability of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice in criminal cases, however, distinguishes criminal dis-
qualification analysis from civil disqualification analysis. See United States v.
Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to apply civil
disqualification precedent in criminal case because civil cases do not "involve
the crucial factor of the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights").
This Note primarily focuses on federal disqualification issues, although
state courts disqualify criminal defense attorneys under similar principles. See
generally Linda A. Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualifi-
cation Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REv.
863, 863 n.5 (1987) (noting that federal courts generally tend to adopt the rules
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variety of situations, 3 disqualification often occurs when an at-
torney has divided loyalties between past and present clients, or
between two or more current clients. For example, when an at-
torney represents a client with interests materially adverse to
those of a past client ("successive representation"), a court may
disqualify the attorney to protect the interests of the past cli-
ent.4 Similarly, when an attorney represents two or more par-
ties in a single case ("multiple representation"), a court may
order that each party retain separate attorneys and bar the cur-
rent attorney from playing any further role in the case.5
Although a dramatic increase in the number of disqualifications
for successive and multiple representation 6 has generated wide-
spread controversy, 7 the Supreme Court, in Wheat v. United
of professional responsibility of the state in which they are located). Because a
vast proportion of white collar prosecutions take place in federal court, how-
ever, joint defense disqualification principally affects federal criminal litigation.
See generally Peter M. Oxman, Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The Remains of the Intangi-
ble Rights Doctrine and Its Proposed Congressional Restoration, 25 Am. CRIm. L.
REV. 743, 785-86 (1988) (discussing factors that limit the power of states to
prosecute white collar criminal cases).
3. A criminal defense attorney's interests conflict with her client's if that
attorney participated in the same criminal conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). Even
when the defense attorney did not participate in the crime, if the government
calls the attorney as a fact witness against her client, that attorney should
withdraw as defendant's trial counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham,
672 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984). Lastly,
if a third party pays the defendant's legal fees, the attorney might have divided
loyalties between the actual client and the third party, which also can require
disqualification. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-71 (1981); United
States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 931-33 (2d Cir. 1993).
4. See infra note 106 (discussing the basic rationale for successive repre-
sentation qualification).
5. See infra note 105 (discussing multiple representation disqualification).
6. See generally William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 781, 801 n.89, 807 (Table 2) (1988) ("Survey results indicate a dramatic
rise in the number of attempts by the prosecution to disqualify defense counsel
... ."); Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93
YALE L.J. 1, 53-54 (1983) ("The frequency of prosecution motions to disqualify
criminal defense lawyers has increased dramatically in recent years.");
Ephraim Margolin & Sandra Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal De-
fense Counsel, 20 AM. CrIM. L. REv. 227, 227-28 (1982) (asserting that prosecu-
tors have "increasingly" moved for the disqualification of criminal defense
attorneys).
7. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem
for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIm. L. Rav. 35, 100-01 (1991); Bruce A.
Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1989) [hereinafter
Green, "Through a Glass Darkly"]; Lowenthal, supra note 6, at 1; Margolin &
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States,8 recently affirmed the power of courts to disqualify crimi-
nal defense attorneys in both situations.9
This Note addresses a third basis for attorney disqualifica-
tion which has received less attention than successive or multi-
ple representation. Over the last few years, federal prosecutors
have moved to disqualify criminal defense attorneys under the
"joint defense" doctrine. 10 The joint defense doctrine allows at-
torneys who represent separate targets of criminal investiga-
tions11 to exchange information about their clients without
jeopardizing the confidentiality of the information.12 In complex
Coliver, supra note 6, at 227; Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation of
Targets and Witnesses During a Grand Jury Investigation, 17 Am. CRIm. L. REV.
301, 302-03 (1980).
8. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
9. See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
10. See United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21445 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D. Penn. July 30, 1992); United States v. An-
derson, 790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
11. The joint defense doctrine also protects the secrecy of communications
between codefendants' attorneys after the government has indicted them. See
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). Addi-
tionally, the doctrine protects communications made in confidence by a joint
defense member to any joint defense attorney. See infra note 71.
12. The attorney-client privilege ordinarily protects the secrecy of commu-
nications between clients and their attorneys. A classic statement of the privi-
lege provides that:
The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar or of a court, or his subordinate
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950) (Wyzanski, J.); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981) (stating that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients"). See gener-
ally Ross G. Greenberg et al., Attorney-Client Privilege, Eighth Survey of White
Collar Crime, 30 Am. CRO. L. REv. 1011 (1993) (discussing attorney-client priv-
ilege in context of white collar criminal investigations and prosecutions).
The attorney-client privilege thus does not protect communications that
the client intentionally discloses to a third party. See Handgards, Inc. v. John-
son & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1025 (1980). Thus, a client who discloses confidences to a codefendant's attor-
ney would lose the protection of the attorney-client privilege. The joint defense
doctrine solves this problem by obligating each attorney to protect the secrecy of
joint defense communications that otherwise would lose protection under the
attorney-client privilege. Susan I. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-De-
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federal prosecutions, defense attorneys often establish joint de-
fense "arrangements" to facilitate such communications.' 3 Oc-
casionally, however, a member of a joint defense arrangement
becomes a government witness, usually to incriminate the re-
maining joint defense members.' 4 In such a case, the govern-
ment claims that the remaining joint defense attorneys cannot
remain in the case without violating their ethical duties to the
former member. 15 Arguing that the defendants must receive
legal representation free from any conflicts of interest, the gov-
ernment seeks the disqualification of the remaining joint de-
fense attorneys.' 6
The willingness of federal courts to accept the premises of
the government's argument has "caused great concern and un-
certainty in the white-collar defense community."' 7 Joint de-
fense Doctrine from the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TE. L. REv. 1273, 1283-86
(1990).
13. See Francis J. Burke et al., Responding to a Government Environmen-
tal Investigation: Shaping the Defense, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 509, 538 (1992) (dis-
cussing value of joint defense arrangements in federal criminal prosecutions).
14. The former joint defense member who defects to become a government
witness generally will provide important testimony against the remaining
members. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
15. Specifically, the government has claimed that cross-examination jeop-
ardizes the duties of loyalty and confidentiality that joint defense attorneys
purportedly owe to the former member. See Arthur F. Mathews, Assessing a
New Ruling on Joint Defense, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 23, 1992, at 16, 20 (outlining
government's disqualification theory); Ronald J. Nessim, Conflicts and Confi-
dences-Does Conflict of Interest Kill the Joint Defense Privilege? The Defense
Viewpoint, CRIm. JusT., Spring 1992, at 8 (same).
16. A government witness's interest in maintaining the secrecy of privi-
leged communications outweighs the defendant's interest in cross-examining
the witness on such information. Cf Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
159-160 (1988) (discussing interests that outweigh Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice). A conflict of interest therefore may prevent the joint defense
attorney from rigorously cross-examining the government witness, which in
turn may deny the defendant effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969-71 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982).
17. Nessim, supra note 15, at 8. One commentator has noted that the gov-
ernment's joint defense disqualification theory would allow it to "eliminate a
whole squadron of lawyers simply by turning one codefendant." Gerald F.
Uelmen, The Joint Defense Privilege: Know the Risks, 14 LrrIG., Summer 1988,
at 60; see also Robert S. Bennett, Foreward to Eighth Survey of White Collar
Crime, 30 Am. CRIM. L. Rav. 441, 450-51 (1993) (noting that government has
moved for disqualification of joint defense attorneys to "tip the balance in the
adversarial system in their own favor"); Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of
Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts
Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Prr. L. REV. 405, 455 n.203 (1993) (stating that
joint defense doctrine creates potential conflict of interest when member be-
comes a government witness); Paul L. Seave, Conflicts and Confidences-Does
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fense disqualification not only impinges on a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice,' 8 it also threatens the
very existence of joint defense arrangements, which serve im-
portant purposes in complex criminal cases. 19 Moreover, joint
defense disqualification unfairly denies the right to counsel of
choice to individuals who retain separate attorneys specifically
to avoid conflicts of interest that multiple representation would
otherwise present.20 Traditional disqualification doctrine, par-
ticularly the Court's decision in Wheat, does not adequately ad-
dress these unique considerations and courts should therefore
take steps to strictly limit joint defense disqualification.
This Note proposes a per se rule against joint defense dis-
qualification. Part I details the competing tensions that under-
lie joint defense disqualification and discusses the roles of the
right to counsel of choice and joint defense arrangements in com-
plex, white collar criminal cases. Part II contends that,
although joint defense attorneys have ethical obligations to
maintain the confidentiality of specific joint defense communica-
tions, a member's decision to become a government witness
should not deprive the arrangement's remaining members of
their chosen attorneys. Part III sets forth the per se rule and
provides two exceptions that protect the secrecy of specific joint
defense communications and prevent abuse of the joint defense
doctrine. This Note concludes that a per se rule against joint
defense disqualification, subject to the proposed exceptions, will
ensure fairness in the adversarial system of criminal justice.
Conflict of Interest Kill the Joint Defense Privilege? The Prosecution Viewpoint,
CRm. JUST., Spring 1992, at 7 (arguing that courts should disqualify criminal
defense attorneys under the joint defense doctrine); White Collar Prosecutors
Probe Joint Defense Agreements, DOJ ALERT, July 1991, at 3 (observing that
federal prosecutors believe that the joint defense doctrine may require
disqualification).
18. The Court has consistently held that the Sixth Amendment affords pro-
tection to a criminal defendant's choice of counsel. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); see also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9
(1954) (denying criminal defendant opportunity to obtain counsel deprived de-
fendant of due process of law guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
19. The Seventh Circuit observed in a criminal fraud case that a joint de-
fense arrangement "can be necessary to a fair opportunity to defend." United
States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979); see also JACK B. WEiNsTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Evi-
DENCE 91 503(b)[06], at 503-99 & n.2 (1992 & 1993 supp.) [hereinafter WEiN-
STE N's EVIDENCE] (discussing Standard 503(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, not adopted, which extends the attorney-client privilege to joint de-
fense communications).
20. See Rushing, supra note 12, at 1283.
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I. THE PROCESSES AND INTERESTS UNDERLYING
JOINT DEFENSE DISQUALIFICATION IN WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME
The phrase "white collar crime" encompasses a broad vari-
ety of federal law infractions.2 1 The white collar label applies to
anyone violating a host of statutes and regulations, not just the
socioeconomically elite miscreant.22 From antitrust violations to
wire fraud, Congress has criminalized many "tawdry business
practices."23 Administrative agencies have demonstrated simi-
lar industriousness. According to one estimate, the federal gov-
ernment can use criminal penalties to enforce at least 300,000
regulations. 24 In the early 1970s, the federal government began
a vigorous campaign against white collar crime. 25 Since then,
the number of white collar prosecutions has increased
significantly.26
21. For example, one authority defines white collar crimes as "various
types of unlawful, nonviolent conduct committed by corporations and individu-
als including theft or fraud and other violations of trust committed in the course
of the offender's occupation (e.g., embezzlement, commercial bribery, racketeer-
ing, anti-trust violations, price-fixing, stock manipulation, insider trading, and
the like)." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Originally, "white collar crime" identified a class of perpetrators rather
than a type of substantive offense. See EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHrrE COLLAR
CRIME 9 (1949). This definition distinguished otherwise "respectable" individu-
als committing crimes in the course of their occupations from so-called "ordi-
nary" criminals. See id. at 9-10. Prior to the early 1970s, white collar criminals
found themselves in a rather exclusive club. Although many high status indi-
viduals committed sufficiently unseemly acts to arouse the wrath of a civil
plaintiff, only rarely did they inspire a federal criminal prosecution. See gener-
ally John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean 'Criminal"?: Reflections On The
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193
(1991) (criticizing recent expansion of federal criminal law).
23. Boris Kostelanetz, Foreward to ROGER J. MAGNUSON, THE WHITE COL.-
LAR-CR=ME ExPLOsION ix (1993).
24. Coffee, supra note 22, at 216 & n.94.
25. Id. at 202 & n.27 (citing KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WmTE
COLLAR CRnnA: CASES AND MATERIALS XXV (1990)). Commentators offer two
basic explanations for this sudden, yet prolonged offensive. Some suggest that
the federal government abruptly realized the "tremendous cost" of white collar
crime. See, e.g., Genego, supra note 6, at 789. Others explain that crime simply
became more complex. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 393 (1992); Henning, supra note 17, at 408.
26. In the 1980s, as white collar crime remained one of the federal govern-
ment's "top national priorities," ROGER J. MAGNUSON, THE WHrrE COLLAR-
CRIME EXPLOsioN 6 (1993) (quoting statement of William Sessions), Congress
nearly quadrupled the DOJ's budget. Bennett, supra note 17, at 441. By 1993,
the DOJ had $9.3 billion in its war chest. Id. Today prosecution of white collar
crime remains one of the DOJ's top priorities. See Reno Sets Priorities at Con-
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A white collar actus reus typically involves an unobtrusive
swindle or regulatory violation, rather than violence or physical
intrusion.2 7 Thus, when investigating white collar crime, the
government seeks to identify a series of transactions that consti-
tute a criminal scheme, as well as a combination of otherwise
innocent circumstances from which to infer criminal intent.28
To this end, the government often must penetrate intricate crim-
inal networks to pursue paper trails that can easily disappear.29
After an investigation reveals improprieties, often the pros-
ecution still must show that a white collar defendant has done
something morally wrong to secure a conviction.30 Otherwise a
jury might nullify the charge by finding a technically guilty de-
fendant innocent.3 1 Adding to this problem the difficulty of ex-
plaining exactly what the defendant did, the government
assigns its most talented attorneys to white collar cases and
firmation Hearing, DOJ ALERT, April 1993, at 1 (quoting Janet Reno as identi-
fying "complex economic crime that cuts across state lines" as a prosecution
priority).
27. "[W]hite collar crime rarely involves violence directed toward victims or
innocent bystanders, which is frequently an object of street crimes." Henning,
supra note 17, at 406 n.3. White collar crime instead "involves a process of
events, many of which are common business occurrences that may be otherwise
socially desirable." Id. at 406.
28. See Genego, supra note 6, at 782-783. In contrast, "ordinary" or
"street" crime generally presents a single unlawful event. KENNETH MANN, DE-
FENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRmrE: A PORTRAIT OF ATroRNEys AT WORK 4-5 & n.*
(1985). Consequently, investigations of street crime serve to gather evidence
generally to reconstruct an isolated incident. Henning, supra note 17, at 406.
"The prosecutor's concerns are directed toward forensic issues, proper custody
and identification of physical evidence, and accurate depictions of the crime
scene." Id.
29. "Complex investigations involving fraud in health care, housing, gov-
ernment contracts, and securities implicate a wide range of business activities
that routinely involve the creation of thousands of pages of documents by nu-
merous legitimate organizations." Henning, supra note 17, at 413.
30. Vincent J. Connelly & Tyrone C. Fahner, Unconventional Strategies in
White-Collar Criminal Investigations, LiTIG., Winter 1988, at 17, 21 (discussing
government's obligation to prove "mercurial element of intent" in white collar
criminal cases).
31. See The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullifica-
tion"." When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law To Do Justice, 30 Ari. Cmnm.
L. RE V. 239, 239 (1993). The moral culpability of white collar crimes has in-
spired much debate. Compare Coffee, supra note 22, at 193 (lamenting "the
disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law")
with William P. Barr, Foreward to Seventh Survey of White Collar Crime, 29
Am. Cami. L. REv. 169, 169 (1992) (responding that white collar crimes "involve
truly culpable conduct and result in truly palpable harm").
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funds their efforts accordingly. 32 After all, unlike civil litigants,
the government has only one opportunity to establish guilt.3 3
B. THE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
American criminal procedure affords criminal defendants
an array of protections against the government's law enforce-
ment "machinery."3 4 One protection, however, stands out from
the rest. Courts consider the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
legal representation a defendant's most vital right,35 because it
ensures that the defendant has access to other constitutional
rights.36 The Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to in-
clude the right to effective assistance of counsel.37 The right to
effective assistance of counsel, in turn, encompasses the right to
counsel of undivided loyalty.38 A court will therefore vacate a
32. MAGNUSON, supra note 26, at 12-13.
33. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
34. "Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums
of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime." Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). For background on American criminal
procedural protections, see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1992) (describing "constitutionalization" of
criminal procedure).
35. The Supreme Court has stated that "[iun an adversary system of crimi-
nal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of
counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978); see also United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (stating that Sixth Amendment is defend-
ants "most pervasive" right); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1972)
(finding right to legal representation more fundamental than right to a jury
trial).
36. "Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little conse-
quence... for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights."
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citations omitted). The
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause also provides limited protection against
prosecutorial practices that threaten adversarial fairness in the criminal justice
system. See, e.g., Genego, supra note 6, at 834-840 (noting, however, that Court
has recently been unwilling to apply due process analysis in such cases).
37. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[Tlhe Court has
recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.'" (citation omitted)).
38. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) ("the 'assistance of
counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assist-
ance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one law-
yer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests"); see also Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1980) (holding that defendant cannot receive
effective assistance of counsel from attorney with a conflict of interest); Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483-87 (1978) (holding that court violates Sixth
Amendment by forcing attorney to jointly represent parties with conflicting
interests).
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criminal conviction if the defendant shows that an actual con-
flict of interest caused unreasonably deficient representation.39
The Sixth Amendment also provides a limited right to coun-
sel of choice.40 This right rests mainly on the understanding
that a criminal defendant ought to have control over his fate.4 1
In this regard, courts have recognized that criminal defense at-
torneys are not fungible.42 Many defense attorneys specialize
their practices to meet the needs of specific clients, particularly
white collar defendants. 43 Also, defense attorneys differ on stra-
tegic issues and styles of advocacy, 44 and an effective attorney-
client relationship often depends on the defendant's trust in, and
rapport with, a particular attorney.45 Nevertheless, the right to
counsel of choice does not allow a defendant to retain counsel
39. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869
F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing conviction when defendant's attorney
did not vigorously cross-examine former client for fear of disclosing confidential
information), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989). But cf Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 165 (1985) ("[Breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make
out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel." (em-
phasis added)).
40. The Court has stated that "[ult is hardly necessary to say that the right
to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932);
see also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954) (holding that court must grant
defendant reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of choice); Glasser, 315 U.S.
at 70 (same). The Court has interpreted this right to protect a defendant's
choice of pro se representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21
(1975). Recently, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts should
recognize only apresumption in favor of a defendant's chosen counsel. Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 164 (1988) (stating that Sixth Amendment
does not ensure that "a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer
whom he prefers."); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful attorney-client
relationship").
41. The right to counsel of choice "stem[s] largely from an appreciation that
a primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to grant a criminal defendant
effective control over the conduct of his defense. . . . '[I]t is he who suffers the
consequences if the defense fails.'" Wheat, 486 U.S. at 165-66 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-20).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (1979) (discussing
differences in criminal defense representation that, "within the range of effec-
tive and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of a
defense").
43. See MANN, supra note 28, at 19-34 (describing "The White-Collar Crime
Defense Bar"); Genego, supra note 6, at 795-98 (calling white collar criminal
defense attorneys "The New Adversary"); Henning, supra note 17, at 409 (not-
ing development of "a defense bar devoted primarily to white collar cases").
44. Laura, 607 F.2d at 56.
45. Id.
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whose presence in the case might create a ground for reversal,
namely a conflict of interest.46
C. A CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATroRNEY's ETHIcAL DUTIES TO HER
CLIENT
The extent of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to conflict-free counsel depends partly on the nature of the
attorney's ethical responsibilities. 47 Under the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules"),48 a criminal defense attorney owes two primary ethical
duties to a client.49 First, an attorney must serve her client with
absolute fidelity.50 In addition, an attorney must not reveal her
client's confidential communications. 51 A "conflict of interest"
46. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-162 (1988).
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) ("Model Rules"). The
Model Rules constitute the majority rule regarding the legal profession's ethical
responsibilities. Drafted by the American Bar Association ("ABA7) in 1983, the
provisions of the Model Rules pertinent to attorney disqualification have be-
come, in whole or in part, the official ethical code for 39 states and the District
of Columbia. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFES.
SIONAL CoNDucT § 1, at 3-4 (1992). Given that a United States District Court
typically applies the ethical rules of the state in which it sits, the Model Rules
have become the primary authority for analyzing client-related conflicts of in-
terest in the federal system. See Winslow, supra note 2, at 863 n.5.
The ABA drafted the Model Rules in 1983 to replace the MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY (1969) ("Model Code"). Although a few states
have retained the Model Code's provisions, this Note addresses only the Model
Rules. The main difference between the Model Rules and the Model Code in the
context of attorney disqualification is that the Model Rules codified the disqual-
ification case law developed under the Model Code prior to 1983. Goldberg,
supra note 2, at 230. Thus, discussion of the Model Rules essentially incorpo-
rates the provisions of the Model Code. For a detailed comparison of the provi-
sions of the Model Rules and the Model Code, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2d ed. 1992).
49. The term "client" includes one for whom a lawyer renders legal service,
or one who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining such services. WEiN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 19, T 503(a)(1)[01], at 503-21 to 503-22. "There is
no requirement that the services - so long as they are legal services - have
been rendered in conjunction with litigation or that a fee has been paid." Id.
50. "[Tlhe duty of loyalty... [is] perhaps the most basic of counsel's du-
ties." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 & cmt. "Preserva-
tion of confidences, a concept almost as old in the law as loyalty.., was origi-
nally a matter of social morality - an ethical imperative for all good members
of society." Goldberg, supra note 2, at 232. Now the obligation of the attorney
to protect confidences, like the attorney-client privilege, serves the utilitarian
purpose of promoting client candor. Id. at 233; see also infra note 60 (discussing
distinction between ethical duty of loyalty and attorney-client privilege).
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exists whenever an attorney cannot abide by either rule.52 In
the event of a conflict, the attorney must protect the interests of
the client or face disqualification from the case. 53 Moreover, at-
torneys who violate their ethical duties possibly face disciplinary
sanctions. 54
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules sets forth an attorney's duty of
confidentiality. Except in certain limited circumstances, a "law-
yer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation. . . ."5 The
Comment to Rule 1.656 explains that "[t]he confidentiality rule
applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by
the client but also to all information relating to the representa-
tion, whatever its source."5 7 Protection of confidentiality facili-
tates development of facts and "encourages people to seek early
legal assistance."58 The attorney's obligations in this regard en-
dure even after the attorney-client relationship ends.59 In es-
sence, Rule 1.6 codifies an attorney's duty to maintain the
secrecy of communications protected by the attorney-client
privilege.60
52. "Conflicts of interest arise whenever an attorney's loyalties are divided
.. " United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2812 (1991).
53. See discussion infra part I.F.
54. "Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends
primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon re-
inforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon en-
forcement through disciplinary proceedings." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDUCT pmbl.
55. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.6(a).
56. A "Comment" accompanies each Model "Rule." The Comments explain
the scope and purpose of the Rules, "but the text of each Rule is authoritative."
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT pmbl.
57. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt.
58. Id.
59. Id. ("The duty of confidentiality continues even after the client-lawyer
relationship has terminated.").
60. The Comment to Rule 1.6 explains the distinction between an attor-
ney's duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege as follows:
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of
law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doc-
trine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established
in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial
and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or
otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of
client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.
MODEL RLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.6 cmt.
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Rules 1.7 and 1.9 articulate an attorney's duty of loyalty to
current and former clients. Rule 1.7(a) bars an attorney from
representing a client whose interests are directly adverse to an-
other current client.61 Rule 1.7(b) forbids an attorney from rep-
resenting a client when obligations to another client or third
person would be "materially limited" by such representation.62
Rule 1.7, however, permits the attorney to represent a client in
either situation if the attorney reasonably believes that repre-
sentation would not "adversely affect" the other client, or if the
other client consents to the representation. 63 Similarly, Rule
1.9(a) provides that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person
in the same or a substantially related matter in which that per-
son's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the for-
mer client unless the former client consents after
consultation."64 Thus, the attorney's duty of absolute fidelity
precludes the attorney from switching sides on a current or for-
mer client.65
D. JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS IN WHITE COLLAR CASES
Defendants 66 in complex federal criminal investigations and
their separate attorneys often unite to mount a joint defense. 67
61. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 1.7(a).
62. Id. 1.7(b).
63. Id. 1.7(a)(1)-(2) & (b)(1)-(2). "Consideration should be given to whether
the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved." Id. cmt.
64. Id. 1.9(a).
65. Id. cmt. (establishing inquiry of whether the attorney's "subsequent
representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in
question"). Importantly, for purposes of Rule 1.9(a), it does not matter whether
such representation would jeopardize the confidentiality of attorney-client com-
munications. See supra text accompanying note 64. If the attorney has
switched sides, Rule 1.9(a) mandates disqualification. Additionally, Rule
1.9(c)(1) bars an attorney from using a former cient's confidences against the
former client. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.9(C)(1).
66. Technically, the government considers an individual suspected of crim-
inal activity a "target" until a grand jury indicts the individual. A target is a
"person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence
linking him/her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the
prosecutor, is a putative defendant." U.S. DEI'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATr'Ys MAN-
UAL § 9-11.151 (1990). The term "defendant" in this Note includes targets of
federal criminal investigations.
67. It might seem counterproductive for targets of an investigation to re-
tain separate attorneys, for a single attorney could better coordinate informa-
tion sharing. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MmN. L. REv. 1095, 1172 (1991). Disqualifica-
tion for multiple representation, however, necessitates separate representation
for those targets who want to ensure that their attorney will remain in the case.
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An effective joint defense requires uninhibited communication
among the member defendants and their attorneys. To ensure
that communications within the group remain confidential
under the attorney-client privilege, 68 the defendants typically
invoke69 the joint defense doctrine. This doctrine maintains the
secrecy of communications 70 among parties71 sharing common
interests72 in defending against a common adversary.73 Parties
to such an arrangement, at least in theory, can prevent a fellow
See infra note 105. In this sense, separate representation and the joint defense
doctrine ostensibly allow the targets to keep their individual attorneys and ben-
efit from joint discussions. Rushing, supra note 12, at 1283.
68. See supra note 12. One commentator has proposed that courts recog-
nize a joint defense privilege wholly distinct from the attorney-client privilege.
Rushing, supra note 12, at 1276.
69. Parties often prudently invoke the doctrine by means of a written
agreement. See Paul L. Perito et al., Joint Defense Agreements: Protecting the
Privilege, Protecting the Future, CPi. JusT., Winter 1990, at 6, 39-42 (describ-
ing elements of formal agreements and providing sample agreements). In the
absence of a written agreement, however, some courts have retroactively in-
ferred joint defense arrangements to protect communications made thereunder.
See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347,
350 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Perito et al., supra, at 9 (noting that a joint defense
agreement "may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a communica-
tion"). For a discussion of possible limitations of written agreements, see infra
note 177.
70. The joint defense doctrine protects verbal communications and ex-
changes of work-product, including notes and memoranda. See Perito et al.,
supra note 69, at 7. But see Uelmen, supra note 17, at 38 (calling for caution
with respect to joint defense exchanges of work product).
71. Specifically, the joint defense doctrine only protects communications
between joint defense attorneys, or between a joint defense member (i.e., a tar-
get or defendant) and one or more of the joint defense attorneys. WEINsTEn 's
EVIDENCE, supra note 19, 503(b)[06], at 503-99 to 503-100 (suggesting that
the "better and safer practice" is to leave clients out of joint defense attorney
conferences). The doctrine does not protect communications between members
outside the presence of their attorneys. Henning, supra note 17, at 456 & n.207
(citing United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
72. The parties need not share identical interests. See WEmnsTEINs EVI-
DENCE, supra note 19, 1 503(b)[06], at 503-100 to 503-101 & n.5 (stating that
courts interpret the "common interest" requirement broadly in multiparty situ-
ations) (discussing cases). As one commentator has noted, separate representa-
tion indicates that the targets do not have completely aligned interests. See
Rushing, supra note 12, at 1288-93.
73. The "in defending against" requirement means that the statements
must relate to the defense. WEiNsTEn's EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 503(b)[061,
at 503-100 n.6. But see Uelmen, supra note 17, at 36 (noting that some courts
"have extended the privilege to virtually any exchange of information").
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member or attorney from disclosing joint defense
communications. 74
Cooperation under the joint defense doctrine offers numer-
ous practical advantages to defendants. 75 When defendants
share factual information, they can better present a "coherent
and plausible defense rather than one riddled with immaterial
inconsistencies."76 Similarly, group discussions on strategic is-
sues help each member better develop an individual theory of
defense, particularly if the defendants all expect to be indicted.77
An alliance among defendants also provides a potent way of
monitoring the government's investigation.78 For these reasons,
courts recognize that the joint defense doctrine "can be neces-
sary to a fair opportunity to defend" in white collar cases.7 9
Prosecutors have emphasized, however, that joint defense
arrangements can present two significant problems. A joint de-
fense arrangement allows its members to shape testimony and
74. A troublesome limitation arguably exists with respect to the duration
of the joint defense privilege. If parties to a joint defense agreement develop
materially adverse interests in subsequent litigation, some courts have said
that the privilege collapses among them. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(dicta). Although no court has actually held that the joint defense doctrine col-
lapses when former joint defense members find themselves at each others'
throats, a number of courts have endorsed the court's reasoning in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena. Rushing, supra note 12, at 1298-99 & nn.164-166 (discussing
cases); see also Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:
A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. Jom's L. REv. 191, 292-93 (1989) (finding
the subsequent litigation rule a "well-settled principle" with respect to joint de-
fense agreements); Perito et al., supra note 69, at 39 (assuming validity of sub-
sequent litigation rule in joint defense situations).
75. "A common defense often gives strength against a common attack."
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
cited with approval in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) and Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-83 (1978).
76. Perito et al., supra note 69, at 40.
77. "Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is often not
only in their own best interests but serves to expedite the trial or ... the trial
preparation." United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
78. See Burke et al., supra note 13, at 538; Henning, supra note 17, at 455;
Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee
Owed More Protection Than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REv. 1, 50
(1990).
79. See McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1336. The Virginia Supreme Court forged
the joint defense doctrine well over a century ago in a criminal conspiracy case,
Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 842 (1871) (ruling that
jointly indicted defendants and their individual attorneys have a "right ... to
consult together about the case and the defense").
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perhaps even coordinate perjury.80 Moreover, in the hands of
sophisticated criminal networks, a joint defense arrangement
can effectively keep innocent or less culpable subordinates in
line with a "stonewall" defense.81 In such circumstances, the
ringleaders of a criminal conspiracy may coerce or deceive their
subordinates into keeping them aware of all facts about a crimi-
nal investigation, including contacts by law enforcement
agents.8 2 Armed with such knowledge, the ringleaders may,
through coercion or deception, prevent the subordinates from co-
operating with the government.8 3
E. WHEN A JOINT DEFENSE MEMBER BECOMES A GovERNMENT
WITNESS
No matter how impregnable a joint defense arrangement
appears, the possibility always exists that one member will be-
come a government witness.8 4 Just as white collar criminal de-
fense attorneys consider it their duty to erect and maintain a
common defense,8 5 a dutiful prosecutor will work to recruit in-
80. See Henning, supra note 17, at 455.
81. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representa-
tion: The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARv. L. REv. 670, 694-
96 (1992).
82. Id. at 696.
83. Henning, supra note 17, at 458-59.
84. See Burke et al., supra note 13, at 543 (noting that joint defense mem-
bers should recognize "ever-present potential for today's ally to become to-
morrow's adversary"); see also Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in
Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1, 47 (1992) (observing that "one could simply
be thankful that it is in criminals' nature to cut each others' throats"). One
former prosecutor observed that informants will do anything to avoid prison,
including "lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting others
to corroborate their lies with more lies, and doublecrossing anyone with whom
they come into contact." Monroe Freedman, The Lawyer Who Hates Snitches,
CHAMPION, Apr. 1994, at 25. He also commented that some view informants as
"conscienceless sociopaths to whom 'truth' is a wholly meaningless concept." Id.
85. One commentator asserts that the white collar criminal defense attor-
ney's principal function is "information control," or keeping incriminating evi-
dence out of the government's hands. MANN, supra note 28, at 6. The most
fearsome form of information leakage occurs when one target of a criminal in-
vestigation becomes a government witness. See infra notes 87-89 and accompa-
nying text. Joint defense arrangements, however, "enable individual
defendants to know the status of each other's efforts and to be sure that none of
the codefendants is cooperating with the government. This knowledge, in turn,
makes it less likely that a defendant will agree to cooperate with the govern-
ment." Genego, supra note 6, at 797 n.69; see also Karlan, supra note 81, at 694
(describing how a joint defense can negate the "prisoner's dilemma").
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formers from the joint defense to testify against the others.8 6
Often the prosecutor has little choice; a witness familiar with
the intricacies of a white collar criminal enterprise might offer
the only evidence of how a complex scheme worked.8 7 Also,
given the ability of white collar criminals to destroy documen-
tary evidence,88 a witness familiar with the enterprise's records
might provide the only proof that an unlawful transaction even
occurred.89
Cooperating with the government may offer a government
witness many benefits. Sometimes the witness avoids indict-
ment altogether.90 If the individual appears relatively less cul-
pable than the remaining joint defense members, or creates that
image by foisting blame on the others,91 a prosecutor might
choose to formally or informally immunize him from future pros-
ecution in exchange for the witness's testimony.9 2 More com-
86. See United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (dis-
qualifying attorney who represented targets that government was trying to
turn against each other); In Re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187 (2d Cir. 1977) (ac-
knowledging that government brought motion to disqualify to break apart
"stonewall" defense).
87. "Since many white collar and drug offenses are committed in private,
among groups of willing participants, the government often relies on confiden-
tial informants to gather information." Genego, supra note 6, at 791-92.
88. See Henning, supra note 17, at 413 (noting prosecutors' reliance on doc-
umentary evidence).
89. See, e.g., Charles Q. Jakob, Note, Good Bad Press: Observations and
Speculations About Internal Revenue Service Accountant-Informants, 54 OHIo
ST. L. J. 199, 209 n.55 (1993) (discussing difficulty of proving tax crimes with-
out assistance of informant).
90. Federal prosecutors exercise enormous discretion in determining
whether to charge a certain individual. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312
(1987) (stating that a prosecutor can "decline to charge.., in any particular
case").
91. "These are agreements to sell a commodity - knowledge. The witness
usually gains that knowledge through participation in criminal conduct, and
the offer of testimony is a calculated attempt to gain immunity or leniency."
Hughes, supra note 84, at 13.
92. Immunity becomes necessary when a witness asserts the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No persons
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
... ."). A prosecutor may formally request that a court immunize a witness
under 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988), which requires a showing that the witness's tes-
timony is "necessary" and that the witness would otherwise likely assert his
Fifth Amendment rights. Id. Formal immunity (or "use and fruits" immunity)
extends only to prevent the government from prosecuting the witness on the
basis of the immunized testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460
(1972). Informal immunity (or "transactional immunity") totally bars the gov-
ernment from prosecuting the criminal conduct to which the witness's testi-
mony relates, provided that the witness cooperates in a satisfactory manner.
See Hughes, supra note 84, at 7-13 (discussing informal immunity agreements
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monly, a prosecutor offers to charge the witness with fewer
crimes, thereby reducing his overall exposure to criminal penal-
ties.93 Additionally, after a witness pleads guilty, the prosecutor
can make a variety of motions, including the widely-used "sub-
stantial assistance" motion,94 to significantly reduce the wit-
ness's sentence.95
A joint defense member's defection has grave practical con-
sequences for the arrangement's remaining members. The gov-
ernment deals only with those who offer helpful evidence.96
Thus, whereas before the joint defense kept the government's
investigation in the shadows by maintaining uniform silence, a
defecting joint defense member's insights will provide a window
to the facts of the case.97 Moreover, a joint defense member will
have knowledge about the strategies of the joint defense itself.98
If the defecting member knows that a reduced sentence depends
largely on the "significance and usefulness"99 of the information
provided, presumably he will surreptitiously disclose informa-
tion that the joint defense doctrine would otherwise protect. 00
and noting that disputes have arisen over whether the witness adequately
"performed").
93. See supra note 90.
94. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COIMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1
(1994). Section 5K1.1 allows a court to depart below the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines ("Guidelines") sentencing range "[u]pon motion of the govern-
ment stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense."
Id. In determining the "appropriate reduction," the court may consider a vari-
ety of factors, including the "significance and usefulness" of the witness's testi-
mony. Id.
95. A "substantial assistance" departure, for example, allows a court to
sentence a witness even below the statutory minimum sentence for his offense.
Id. comment. (n.1) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)). For a discussion of other mo-
tions the government can make to reduce a witness's sentencing exposure, see
Hughes, supra note 84, at 44.
96. Judge Easterbrook describes the quid pro quo in this way: "[The de-
fendant] might find it in his interests to strike a deal with the prosecutors, who
would require [him] to sing for his supper." United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d
1382, 1385 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989).
97. See supra notes 86-89.
98. See, e.g., FDIC v. Cheng, No. 3:90-CV-0353-H, 1992 WL 420877, *2
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1992) (individual who secretly cooperated with government
for two years while purportedly remaining a member of a joint defense arrange-
ment stated that he had "tactically outmaneuvered" the other members of the
arrangement); see also Uelmen, supra note 17, at 38, 60 (observing that former
member can easily disclose joint defense secrets).
99. See supra text accompanying note 94.
100. Uelmen, supra note 17, at 37. The joint defense is virtually powerless
to prevent such disclosure. Id.; see infra note 177.
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F. THE GovERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
A joint defense member's defection can pose an additional
and far more meaningful problem for the arrangement's remain-
ing members: the government may seek the disqualification of
their attorneys.' 01 Disqualification of a criminal defense lawyer
for client-related conflicts of interest generally serves two pur-
poses.' 0 2 First, by entirely removing the criminal defense attor-
ney from the case, it ensures that the attorney will not violate
any ethical duties to a government witness or codefendant.' 0 3
In addition, disqualification protects a client's right to effective
101. Although a court may disqualify an attorney sua sponte, Wheat v.
United States, 486 F.2d 153, 160 (1988), courts usually disqualify pursuant to a
government motion. See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecu-
tor's Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest,
16 Am. J. Cmm. L. 323, 353 (1989) [hereinafter Green, Her Brother's Keeper].
The government bases its disqualification argument on the superficially anom-
alous concern that the defendant should receive effective assistance of counsel.
See supra notes 37-39. Defendants and their lawyers often consider the govern-
ment's argument paternalistic at best, noxious at worst. See, e.g., Bennett,
supra note 17, at 450 (criticizing attempts by prosecutors to disqualify defense
attorneys while rejecting the application of ethics rules to themselves). The
prosecutorial desire for effective assistance of counsel, however, merely results
from the legitimate governmental interest in safeguarding any resulting convic-
tion from a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal. See supra note 39 and ac-
companying text; infra note 104.
102. Defense attorneys maintain that the government often harbors sinister
designs when seeking disqualification. According to two commentators, "the
government's primary motive in bringing [disqualification] motions is to dis-
qualify the most competent lawyers and firms .... " Margolin & Coliver, supra
note 6, at 229. Other commentators also recognize that tactical motivations
might prompt the government to move for disqualification. See, e.g., Gershman,
supra note 25, at 402-03; Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 101, at 348;
Lowenthal, supra note 6, at 53 n.226. In this regard, one district court made
the following observation:
[T]he court should be extremely careful not to let the government's at-
tempted disqualification of defense counsel "transform the sixth
amendment right to conflict-free counsel into a two-edged sword with
which the government would be able to sever defendants from those
most able to protect their legitimate legal interests."
United States v. Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 (D. Kan. 1987) (quoting In re
Paradyne, 803 F.2d 604, 611 (11th Cir. 1986)).
103. In other words, the court exercises its power to "ensur[e] that criminal
trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession." Wheat, 486
U.S. at 160. In a case of successive representation, the attorney owes ethical
duties the past client (now a government witness) and the current client (the
defendant on trial). See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. When an
attorney represents multiple clients (usually codefendants) at once, a conflict of
interest arises from the attorney's ethical obligations to each defendant. See
supra notes 61-63, 65 and accompanying text.
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assistance of counsel, which the attorney's conflict of interest
would otherwise threaten.10 4
Disqualification of attorneys on these grounds traditionally
occurs in cases of multiple 0 5 and successive 0 6 representation.
Recently, in Wheat v. United States, a case involving both situa-
tions, the Supreme Court ruled that trial courts may disqualify
defense attorneys even when only a potential conflict of interest
exists. 0 7 Notwithstanding the "right to select and be repre-
104. The desire to protect the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel "arises in part from the legitimate wish of district courts that their
judgments remain intact on appeal." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161. A criminal de-
fendant has a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."). Unless the
defendant represents himself pro se, he can exercise this right only through his
attorney. To provide effective assistance of counsel, the attorney must be able
to cross-examine each government witness free from any conflicts of interest.
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64.
105. See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); United States
v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alex, 788 F. Supp. 359
(N.D. Ill. 1992). These decisions follow the Court's reasoning that:
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what
it tends to prevent the attorney from doing.... [A] conflict may...
prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence preju-
dicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at
the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of one
by emphasizing that of another.
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160 (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90
(1978)). At the time of trial, a federal trial court must advise a jointly repre-
sented defendant about the "right to the effective assistance of counsel, includ-
ing separate representation." FED. R. CRIm. P. 44(c). If the court determines
that disqualification is unnecessary, the court still must "take such measures as
may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel." Id.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
922 (1981). The Eighth Circuit expresses the basic rationale for successive rep-
resentation disqualification as, "(a) the attorney may be tempted to use that
confidential information to impeach the former client; or (b) counsel may fail to
conduct a rigorous examination for fear of misusing his confidential informa-
tion." United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 971 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 834 (1982). In situation (a), the attorney violates the ethical duty of undi-
vided loyalty to a past client. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. In
situation (b), the client fails to receive effective assistance of counsel. See supra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
107. In Wheat, the defendant retained an attorney, Iredale, who already had
ties with two codefendants, Gomez-Barajas and Bravo, in the same prosecution.
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154-56. Iredale had won an acquittal for Gomez-Barajas
and had negotiated a plea agreement for Bravo. Id. at 155. Pursuant to the
government's motion two days before the commencement of the defendant's
trial, the district court disqualified Iredale. Id. at 157. In affirming the dis-
qualification, the Court reasoned that Iredale could not effectively cross-ex-
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sented by one's preferred attorney,"108 the Court further held
that a trial court need not accept a defendant's waiver of the
right to effective assistance of counsel.' 0 9 The Court also stated
that lower courts need not consider whether the former client or
codefendant consents to the representation at issue.110 Instead,
when considering whether to disqualify, "[t]he evaluation of the
facts and circumstances of each case... must be left primarily to
the informed judgment of the trial court," 1 ' even when the gov-
amine either Gomez-Barajas or Bravo, both of whom were potential witnesses
against Wheat. Id. at 163-64. But see id. at 168-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court exaggerated the significance of the potential conflict
and noting that the prosecutor decided to call Bravo only after learning of the
substitution motion).
Essentially, the Court ruled that the district court correctly disqualified
Iredale because of his potential conflicts of interest. In so deciding, the Court
expressly rejected the notion that disqualification should occur only when an
actual conflict of interest exists. Id. at 161-63. The Court reasoned that "the
likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to
predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials." Id. at 162-63.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id. at 162-63; see also United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp. 1313,
1327 (D.N.J. 1992) (refusing to accept defendant's waiver). The Court in Wheat
could have held that a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel, which, if knowing and intelligently done, fore-
closes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, e.g., United States v.
Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1982). In Curcio, the Second Circuit rea-
soned that refusing a knowing and intelligent waiver would be "too paternalis-
tic." Id. at 24-25; see also United States v. Nynex Corp., 788 F. Supp. 16, 22
(D.D.C. 1992) (agreeing that refusal of waiver would "imprison a man in his
privileges" (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942))),
rev'd, 8 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Yet the Court in Wheat refused to hold that a
waiver would cure any conflict of interest problems. 486 U.S. at 163. Instead,
the Court noted the "apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain
ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the
right to conflict-free counsel." Id. at 162. The Court suggested that the "will-
ingness of an attorney to obtain... waivers from his clients may bear an in-
verse relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary information
to them." Id. at 163.
110. Both Gomez-Barajas and Bravo consented to Iredale's representation of
Wheat. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156. Lower courts, however, have emphasized the
importance of the former client's consent in successive representation cases.
Some courts have stressed that the former client's opposition to the attorney's
continued presence in the case makes disqualification appropriate. See, e.g.,
United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 46 (1983). Similarly, other courts have
refused to disqualify when the former client consents. See, e.g., United States v.
Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951
(1984).
111. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. In the end, a court might consider it easiest to
resolve all doubts against the defendant and disqualify, for the defendant will
generally have the resources to hire another competent attorney. See, e.g.,
United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that defend-
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ernnent appears to have "manufacture[d]" a conflict.112 As this
language indicates, the Court did not articulate a specific test
for resolving disqualification motions. Lower courts, however,
still recognize the need to balance the government witness's"13
interest in the loyalty of the former attorney against the defend-
ant's right to counsel of choice under the particular facts of each
case.
114
The Court's decision in Wheat pertains to the disqualifica-
tion of criminal defense attorneys only in cases of multiple and
successive representation. Yet many commentators have recog-
nized that courts may treat joint defense attorneys similarly
when a member of the arrangement defects. 115 In this regard,
ant's ability to retain "more than competent representation" supported disquali-
fication of original counsel).
Considering disqualification "a measure of last resort," many courts recog-
nize two basic alternatives to disqualification. See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi,
807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986). One alternative calls for the defendant to retain
stand-by counsel for the limited purpose of cross-examining the attorney's for-
mer or current client. Compare United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 973 (8th
Cir.) (instructing district court to determine feasibility of stand-by counsel al-
ternative), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982) with United States v. Cheshire, 707
F. Supp. 235, 240 (M.D. La. 1989) (rejecting stand-by counsel alternative be-
cause court "views it as an almost impossible task for a lawyer to participate
throughout the course of a trial but not suggest a single question or style for
cross examination of the most important witness against his present client").
The second alternative limits the range of matters on which the attorney
can cross-examine the government witness. For example, a court may limit the
attorney to questioning the witness about otherwise confidential information
that the government witness publicly disclosed. See, e.g., Cunningham, 672
F.2d at 1073. Courts do not allow attorneys to question former clients on confi-
dential matters, however, even when the attorney could have learned of the
information from an independent source. See, e.g., James, 708 F.2d at 45-46.
112. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163; see also In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d
Cir. 1977) (noting that government "possesses the power to create.., a 'con-
flict'" by calling attorney as witness).
113. In a case of multiple representation, a court will analyze the codefend-
ant's competing interests. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991); James, 708 F.2d at 44; Cunningham, 672 F.2d at
1073. Many courts erroneously also balance the government's interest in dis-
qualification. See, e.g., United States v. Alex, 788 F. Supp. 357, 363-64 (N.D. Ill.
1992). One court has even stated that the government has an interest in shield-
ing its witnesses from unethical cross-examination. See United States v.
DeLuna, 584 F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The government has no legiti-
mate interest, however, in the disqualification of a criminal defense attorney
other than to ensure that a conviction remains intact on appeal, which analysis
of the government witness's interest already comprehends. See supra notes
101, 104.
115. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 17, at 455 n.203; Nessim, supra note 15,
at 8-9; Seave, supra note 17, at 7; Uelmen, supra note 17, at 37.
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joint defense disqualification in civil cases already occurs under
firmly established principles. 116 The government has persuaded
federal courts in at least three instances 117 that the joint de-
fense doctrine creates conflicts of interest that can also require
disqualification in criminal cases.118 Although certain facts in
116. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d
250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that court may disqualify joint
defense attorney to prevent the use of confidential information to the detriment
of a former member).
117. United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21445 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 11447 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992); United States v. Anderson,
790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
118. Bicoastal involved a joint defense arrangement formed in response to a
criminal investigation into an alleged defense procurement fraud. 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21445, at *3-*4. Some of the arrangement's members were in-
dicted (the defendants); others testified before the grand jury and were named
as witnesses in the criminal trial (the witnesses). Id. Three defense attorneys
had represented both their current clients and the witnesses before the grand
jury handed down its indictment-a case of successive representation. Id. Two
other defense attorneys had not represented any witnesses, but had received
confidential information from them under the joint defense agreement. Id. at
*4. The government moved the court to inquire whether any of these arrange-
ments created a conflict of interest requiring the defendants to waive their 6th
Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. Id. The court applied a Wheat analy-
sis to determine whether to disqualify the successive representation attorneys
or the joint defense attorneys. Id. at *16. Although the court found that both
arrangements created similar conflicts of interest, the court held that the de-
fendants' interests outweighed disqualification because none of the former cli-
ent's objected to the defense attorneys' continued presence in the case. Id.
In McDade, a defense attorney briefly represented a suspect in a political
corruption case. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *2. Shortly thereafter the
attorney agreed to represent another individual in the same case and advised
the former client to seek separate counsel, which he did. Id. Both individuals
and their attorneys thereafter shared information pursuant to a joint defense
agreement. Id. at *3. Eventually the former client pleaded guilty, terminated
the joint defense agreement, and agreed to become a government witness. Id.
The government moved to disqualify the defense attorney, but the court re-
fused. Id. Regarding the successive representation issue, the court noted that
the former client did not seek the attorney's disqualification. Id. at *4-*5. To
protect the former client's desire to maintain the secrecy of joint defense com-
munications, however, the court agreed to disqualify unless the defendant
would agree to waive his right to cross-examine his attorney's former client on
the joint defense communications. Id. at *13-*14.
Finally, in Anderson, another defense procurement fraud case, some mem-
bers of a joint defense arrangement became government witnesses. 790 F.
Supp. at 231-32. The government moved to disqualify one of the remaining de-
fendant's counsel whom it believed had access to confidential information under
the joint defense agreement. Id. at 232. The court assumed without discussion
that the joint defense agreement created a conflict of interest, but the court
adverted to the defendant's waiver in deciding not to disqualify. Id. Moreover,
the court noted that the joint defense communications would not impair the
defense attorneys' cross-examination of the witnesses. Id. To the contrary, the
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each case allowed the courts to avoid actually disqualifying the
attorneys,11 9 one district court in a multiple representation case
employed the joint defense doctrine to bolster its disqualification
order.120 Taken together, these decisions support joint defense
disqualification when the government witness supports the gov-
ernment's motion to disqualify, and when the joint defense at-
torneys possess confidential information that would help them
cross-examine the government witness. 121
II. THE ETHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT DEFENSE
DISQUALIFICATION
A. THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS: RECOGNIZING THAT JOINT
DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS CREATE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST WHEN FORMER MEMBERS BECOME
GovERNmENT WiTNEsSEs
A court may not disqualify a criminal defense attorney
under the joint defense doctrine unless the attorney has a poten-
court doubted that "any" information exchanged in the arrangement required
confidentiality. Id.
119. In Bicoastal and McDade, the courts based their decisions principally
on the government witnesses' consent to cross-examination. See supra note
118. In Anderson the court did not disqualify because it obviously doubted that
the parties exchanged any confidential information under the joint defense
agreement. 790 F. Supp. at 232. Additionally, in all three cases the defendants
waived the right to representation by counsel free of undivided interests. Id.
120. See United States v. Moscony, 697 F. Supp. 888, 894 (E.D. Penn. 1988),
affd, 927 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991).
121. The government might have lost the battle (i.e., disqualification of a
particular group of attorneys) in these cases, but under no circumstances did
the government lose the war (i.e., the proposition that a court may disqualify
criminal defense attorneys under the joint defense doctrine). On the contrary,
in each case the court applied traditional disqualification analysis, see supra
note 118 and accompanying text, although joint defense disqualification
presents more complex considerations than disqualification for successive or
multiple representation. See discussion supra part I.C. For instance, if the for-
mer joint defense member in Bicoastal would have supported disqualification,
the result in that case could have been different. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21445,
at *7; see also McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *11 ("Were this witness
to tell the court that he... does not want [the attorneys] in the case, I would
hear him with wide-open ear."). In addition, if the attorneys in Anderson would
have gained a significant amount of information under the joint defense doc-
trine, the court perhaps would have decided to disqualify. 790 F. Supp. at 232.
For purposes of the following analysis, this Note assumes that the government
witness supports disqualification and that the witness, when he was a member
of the joint defense arrangement, divulged confidential information to the attor-
neys that they could use in cross-examining him.
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tial conflict of interest.122 Although successive and multiple rep-
resentation can create conflicts of interest,123 the issue remains
whether a joint defense attorney in a criminal case suffers a sim-
ilar conflict of interest if a member of the arrangement becomes
a government witness. In answering this question, courts will
likely turn to the Model Rules 124 to determine whether the pro-
posed representation violates the "ethical standards of the
profession."' 25
Rule 1.9(a) 126 authorizes courts to disqualify an attorney
representing a client with interests materially adverse to those
of a prior client.127 A court may disqualify the attorney even
when no danger of disclosing confidential information exists.
128
The government has sought disqualification by arguing that
Rule 1.9(a) forbids a joint defense attorney from continuing to
represent her client when the government obtains the services of
a former member of the arrangement. 129 The joint defense doc-
trine, however, does not support this position. Rule 1.9(a) is con-
cerned with the duty of absolute fidelity to former clients. 130 A
joint defense attorney's duty to a former joint defense member
- who is not a "client"'3 ' in the first place - serves only to
protect the confidentiality of information shared while the gov-
ernment witness participated in the joint defense arrange-
ment.'3 2 Because joint defense attorneys do not owe their
122. See discussion supra part I.C.
123. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
125. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).
126. Rule 1.7 does not apply because a government witness is not a current
member of a joint defense arrangement. See supra notes 61-63 and accompany-
ing text. Rule 1.7, which in the context of attorney disqualification pertains to
multiple representation, could perhaps become significant ifjoint defense mem-
bers as codefendants developed materially adverse interests at trial. See infra
text accompanying notes 165-166.
127. Additionally, the parties' interests must be adverse "in the same or a
substantially related matter," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.9(a), which is the case when a former member of the joint defense arrange-
ment testifies against the remaining members.
128. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
129. See e.g., Seave, supra note 17, at 15-16 (arguing that Rule 1.9 some-
times warrants disqualification of joint defense attorneys when former joint de-
fense member testifies for government); Uelmen, supra note 17, at 37
(recognizing potential for disqualification of joint defense attorneys).
130. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
132. See discussion supra part I.D.
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absolute fidelity133 to joint defense members other than their
own clients, Rule 1.9(a) does not apply.134
Rule 1.6, which forbids an attorney from revealing confiden-
tial communications, presents a more significant problem. 135 A
joint defense arrangement functions properly only if its attor-
neys protect its secrets. Thus, although a joint defense attorney
does not have a traditional attorney-client relationship with
every member of the arrangement, a duty to not reveal joint de-
fense information or use such information against each member
still exists.136 This obligation remains even if disclosure of
group secrets would ultimately benefit the attorney's client. 137
Consequently, absent any other considerations, 138 Rule 1.6 bars
the attorney from cross-examining a former joint member when
cross-examination would in any way reveal' 3 9 confidential
information.
133. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
134. Imposing on a joint defense attorney a duty of absolute fidelity to all
joint defense members wrongly puts joint defense arrangements on the same
plane as multiple representation arrangements. After all, members of a joint
defense arrangement retain separate attorneys specifically to avoid the pitfalls
of multiple representation. See supra text accompanying note 20.
135. By its plain terms, Rule 1.6 applies only to the attorney-client relation-
ship. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. The term "client" perhaps
exempts joint defense attorneys from disqualification under Rule 1.6. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text. The essential purpose of Rule 1.6, however, is
to preserve the public's trust in the legal profession by preventing attorneys
from exploiting information entrusted to them. See supra note 51 and accompa-
nying text. Courts have therefore interpreted the rule to cover joint defense
communications. See, e.g., United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *4-5 (E.D. Penn. July 30, 1992). Yet even if a court
strictly construes Rule 1.6, courts still recognize that joint defense attorneys
remain ethically bound as fiduciaries to preserve the confidentiality of joint de-
fense communications. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977). These courts analyze joint defense
disqualification issues under the same principles that Rule 1.6 sets forth. Id.
(holding that joint defense attorney may not use information "to the detriment"
of a former joint defense member.)
136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
138. See discussion infra part H.B.
139. One commentator has suggested that a joint defense attorney violates
no ethical duty by merely relying on, rather than revealing, confidential infor-
mation when cross-examining a former joint defense member. See Nessim,
supra note 15, at 10. This argument rests on the assumption that a joint de-
fense attorney's duty of confidentiality prohibits only direct disclosure of confi-
dential information. Id. Rule 1.6, however, broadly forbids any reliance on, or
indirect revelation of, confidential information. See supra text accompanying
note 57. Through mere reliance on confidential information a skillful joint de-
fense attorney could manipulate a former member's secrets in a manner that
Rule 1.6 forbids. See Seave, supra note 17, at 15.
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Maintaining a rigid wall around the secrecy of joint defense
communications, while not implanting a duty of absolute fidel-
ity, ensures the doctrine's future vitality. In deciding whether to
participate in a joint defense arrangement, prospective members
and their attorneys must be aware that the communications will
remain eternally confidential, subject only to their agreement1 40
to the contrary. Disclosure of joint defense communications,
even to cross-examine a former joint defense member, consti-
tutes a breach of ethical duties. In sum, a joint defense attor-
ney's duty to maintain the confidentiality of information
provided by a government witness, which the attorney could use
in cross-examining that witness, creates a potential conflict of
interest.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYsis: BALANCING THE INTERESTS
OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE
GovERNMENT WiTNEss
Even when prevailing ethical rules support disqualification,
however, the Sixth Amendment further requires courts to bal-
ance the defendant's right to counsel of choice against the inter-
ests of the government witness. 141 Although the Supreme Court
has seemingly reduced the right to counsel of choice to a weak
presumption, 142 lower courts still recognize that adversarial
fairness in complex criminal cases largely depends on access to
counsel of choice. 143 For this reason, the idea that "disqualifica-
tion of defense counsel should be a measure of last resort"
endures. 144
1. The White Collar Criminal Defendant's Interest in
Avoiding Disqualification of His Chosen Counsel
The unique complexity of the typical white collar prosecu-
tion makes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice an
invaluable asset for a number of reasons.145 First, the govern-
140. A court may infer such agreement. See infra note 181 and accompany-
ing text.
141. See supra note 113-114 (discussing traditional disqualification analysis
for client-related conflicts of interest).
142. See supra note 40.
143. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
144. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915, 924 (W.D. Penn. 1979) (calling disqualification a
"Draconian Order").
145. One commentator has observed that the very nature of white collar de-
fendants' conduct "separates them from others .... Many of their crimes are
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ment places white collar cases in the hands of its most skilled
attorneys.1 46 A white collar defendant needs an equally capable
advocate on his side. In addition, many white collar criminal
defendants litigate substantive issues that require an attorney
with specialized knowledge. 147 Finally, white collar cases tend
to involve an enormous amount of documentary evidence that
the defense attorney must process, understand, and manage. 148
For white collar defendants, an "effective advocate"149 can be a
scarce resource.
A disqualification motion presents additional practical
problems for a white collar criminal defendant. The expense of
opposing a disqualification motion can further sap a defendant's
already dwindling financial resources. 150 Moreover, a govern-
ment motion to disqualify will distract the defendant's attorney
from fully concentrating on the substantive defense as counsel
attempts to defuse the appearance of unethical conduct that the
government's motion creates.' 5 ' Lastly, the timing of disqualifi-
cation motions can seriously damage a white collar criminal de-
fendant's cause. A white collar criminal defense attorney often
enters a case at the inception of a government investigation. 15 2
By the time the government has recruited a joint defense mem-
ber from the arrangement's ranks (thereby creating the conflict
of interest), the attorney will often have spent many months on
more complex and more likely to involve manipulation and exploitation of the
gray areas of the law. In such cases, the assistance of counsel is critically im-
portant." Karlan, supra note 81, at 671. But see Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (stating that Sixth Amendment does
not necessarily protect the ability of affluent defendants to retain "high-priced
legal talent").
146. See supra text accompanying note 32.
147. See discussion supra part I.A.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21445, at *3 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) (noting that govern-
ment's evidence in complex fraud prosecution included between "1.5 million and
2.0 million pages" of documentary evidence); see supra note 29 and accompany-
ing text.
149. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (stating that es-
sential purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an "effective
advocate").
150. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 262-63 (discussing "staggering" expense
of opposing a disqualification motion).
151. "Simply by inviting the court to consider whether any potential con-
flicts are likely to develop, the government can succeed in putting defense coun-
sel 'on trial[ ]' ..... Margolin & Coliver, supra note 6, at 229; see also Tague,
supra note 7, at 336 (noting that disqualification motions embarrass counsel
even if court rules against government).
152. MANN, supra note 28, at 9.
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the case. If the government's disqualification motion succeeds, a
replacement attorneyl 53-if the defendant can still afford
one' 54-will not have the same amount of time to become famil-
iar with the case.155
Disqualification under the joint defense doctrine also imper-
ils the existence of joint defense arrangements. If defendants
know that they can lose their attorneys merely by cooperating
with other targets or codefendants, joint defense arrangements
will likely cease to exist.' 56 The risk of a member defecting
looms over any joint defense arrangement, 157 and consequent
disqualification of the group's attorneys might make the risk of
defection too costly to bear. Yet, as courts have recognized, joint
defense arrangements "can be necessary to a fair opportunity to
defend," 58 especially in white collar cases.15 9
2. The Government Witness's Interest in the Disqualification
of a Joint Defense Attorney
Presumptively, an individual who shares information under
the joint defense doctrine should not have to worry about that
153. The defendant will need to retain a replacement because neither the
defendant nor the government may immediately appeal a disqualification deci-
sion. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1984) (holding that de-
fendant may not immediately appeal a disqualification order); United States v.
White, 743 F.2d 488, 494-95 (1984) (holding that government may not immedi-
ately appeal district court's refusal to disqualify).
154. As a district court observed:
[W]hen facing a complex and protracted trial, an accused can expect to
tender a substantial fee, often up front, in order to secure his attorney
of choice. Where... the disqualification comes on the eve of trial, after
dozens of months of pretrial preparation, the disqualified attorney may
have earned most, if not all, of his fee by that time.
United States v. Urbana, 770 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
155. "In an extremely complicated case it may cause a fundamental injustice
to remove the one attorney whose intimate knowledge of the defense and whose
close relationship with the defendants make him practically the only available
attorney capable of presenting effective assistance of counsel." United States v.
Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 (D. Kan. 1987).
156. For a discussion of other arguably illegitimate ways the government
has intruded on the attorney-client relationship, see generally Gershman,
supra note 25, at 402-03 & n.63 (discussing attorney fee forfeitures, attorney
subpoenas, and prosecution of defense attorneys for obstruction of justice).
157. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 833 (1979).
159. See Burke et al., supra note 13, at 538; Henning, supra note 17, at 455-
58; Lowenthal, supra note 6, at 62; Perito et al., supra note 69, at 7; Tate, supra
note 78, at 46-47; Uelmen, supra note 17, at 36-37; see also supra discussion
part I.D.
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information resurfacing, even if the individual becomes a gov-
ernment witness. A former joint defense member expects that
joint defense communications will remain confidential in the
same way that a former client expects that communications to
his attorney will remain confidential. 160 Courts have consist-
ently held that a former client's interest in the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications outweighs a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice;161 the same basic notion
should presumptively hold true for a former joint defense
member.
A crucial distinction, however, separates a former client
from a former joint defense member. When an attorney repre-
sents a client with interests materially adverse to those of a for-
mer client, the former client will almost never have had any
reason to expect that the attorney might cross-examine him.' 62
On the contrary, a joint defense member knows that each of the
arrangement's members already has retained an individual at-
torney.' 63 If the joint defense member becomes a government
witness, that member should reasonably expect to face the joint
defense attorneys in court.
Indeed, if members of a joint defense as codefendants de-
velop adverse interests during trial, the possibility exists that
each will rely on information learned through the joint defense
arrangement to undermine the other's defense.164 For example,
in a fraud prosecution one defendant may want to prove that the
allegedly illegal transaction never occurred. Another defendant,
however, may want to emphasize that the transaction did occur,
but that responsibility for the transaction should lie solely with
the first defendant. If the second codefendant relies on informa-
tion that the first codefendant disclosed under a joint defense
agreement, the first codefendant stands in the same position as
a former joint defense member who becomes a government wit-
ness. This is particularly true if the first codefendant testifies at
trial. In this event, however, disqualification of the codefend-
ants' attorneys seems unthinkable, because each defendant re-
160. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1977) (analogizing former clients to former joint defense members).
161. See supra note 16.
162. The Model Rules clearly forbid such an event. See supra notes 64-65
and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 20.
164. Cf Zafiro v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 933, 937-38 (1993) (holding that
government may jointly try defendants who have mutually antagonistic
defenses).
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lies on joint defense information for the arrangement's intended
purpose: to assist each defendant in developing their individual
defense, including cross-examination of government wit-
nesses.165 Yet, functionally, no meaningful distinction exists to
make joint defense disqualification more plausible when a mem-
ber becomes a government witness.
III. ESTABLISHING A PER SE RULE AGAINST JOINT
DEFENSE DISQUALIFICATION
A per se rule against disqualification under the joint de-
fense doctrine adequately reconciles the continued presence of
the joint defense attorneys in the case with the need to protect
the confidentiality of the former member's specific communica-
tions.166 This rule, however, should be subject to two qualifica-
tions.167 First, the joint defense attorney cannot cross-examine
the former member about specific privileged joint defense com-
munications, 168 and the defendant must understand and con-
sent to this limitation on his right to effective assistance of
counsel.' 69 In addition, if the government clearly and convinc-
165. One prosecutor has suggested, however, "that there may be grounds to
disqualify defense attorneys during trial if the defendants' interests diverge
and their attorneys use information obtained through the joint defense agree-
ment to cross-examine various witnesses." White-Collar Prosecutors Probe
Joint Defense Agreements, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting statement of Larry
Urgenson, chief of the Department of Justice's Criminal Fraud Section).
166. One commentator who also advocates strict controls on joint defense
disqualification has called for a provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to address joint defense disqualification. Nessim, supra note 15, at 52.
Further, the same commentator has proposed an ethical rule to guide attorneys
who participate in joint defense arrangements. Id.
167. This proposal assumes that the joint defense attorney represents the
same client before and after the cooperating witness defects from the arrange-
ment. If the joint defense attorney switches clients, however, a court should
proceed to determine whether the attorney "shopped around" her knowledge of
the government witness's confidential communications. If so, the court should
consider disqualification under traditional doctrine. See supra notes 113-114
and accompanying text.
168. If the former member has disclosed the otherwise confidential joint de-
fense communication, the court should allow the joint defense attorney to cross-
examine on the disclosed matters as well. Cf United States v. Cunningham,
672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that attorney had no duty to main-
tain confidentiality of communications disclosed by former client), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 951 (1984); see supra notes 12, 111.
169. Some courts note that this waiver does not actually waive anything,
because the replacement attorney would not know, and therefore could not use,
the confidential information that the otherwise disqualified attorney could not
use. In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1986).
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ingly proves' 70 that the former joint defense member partici-
pated in the arrangement involuntarily17 1 or did not understand
that the joint defense attorneys could ultimately cross-examine
him if he became a government witness,' 7 2 the court should pro-
ceed with traditional 173 disqualification analysis.
This proposal wholly rejects the idea that a court may dis-
qualify a joint defense attorney simply because a former member
becomes a government witness and consequently has materially
adverse interests to the remaining members of the arrangement.
Rule 1.9(a) does not require such a result,174 and imposing sum-
mary disqualification under the joint defense doctrine eviscer-
ates the defendant's right to counsel of choice175 An attorney's
duty of undivided loyalty lies with that particular attorney's
client, not with other members of the joint defense
arrangement.176
The proposed rule restricts joint defense attorneys from
cross-examining former members in a manner that would reveal
specific confidential communications. 177 This limitation rests on
the assumption that preserving the secrecy of specific joint de-
fense communications adequately protects the former client's in-
terests in light of the defendant's countervailing constitutional
interests. The proposal allows joint defense attorneys to rely on
confidential information in cross-examining a former member,
170. Courts already place a "heavy burden" on the government to show the
necessity of disqualification. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d
1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. See supra text accompanying note 83.
172. See supra text accompanying note 83.
173. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 126-134 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 40 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
177. Commentators suggest including language in formal joint defense
agreements, see supra note 69, to prevent a joint defense member from disclos-
ing the arrangement's confidential communications. See Nessim, supra note
15, at 12, 51-52; Uelmen, supra note 17, at 38. Yet one must question whether
courts would rigorously enforce such contracts, considering the perceived policy
implications of interfering with candid communications between the govern-
ment and cooperating witnesses in criminal cases. Furthermore, and most sig-
nificant, the arrangement will likely never discover whether the cooperating
witness disclosed the confidential communications, for neither the witness nor
the government has an incentive to confirm whether the witness disclosed con-
fidential communications. Id. Thus, "[alIthough a joint privilege enables the
defense lawyers to cooperate with one another, there might be no effective sanc-
tion for defection from the stonewall defense." Karlan, supra note 81, at 694,
(footnote omitted).
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even though such reliance poses ethical problems.178 An order
forbidding reliance on confidential information would be unen-
forceable, however, and barring any cross-examination yields
too harsh a result. In the end, the proposed rule makes the pos-
sibility of cross-examination by former joint defense attorneys a
cost of the former joint defense member's otherwise lucrative179
defection.
The second qualification to the proposed rule protects
against abuse of the joint defense doctrine.' 80 Courts essentially
must determine whether the former member understood the
meaning of the joint defense arrangement and voluntarily par-
ticipated in it. If the government proves the absence of either
condition, disqualification of the joint defense attorneys may be
an appropriate remedy to cure the potential conflict of interest.
When determining whether the former member understood the
arrangement's purpose, a court should consider simply whether
the former member reasonably should have understood that be-
coming a government witness would not prevent cross-examina-
tion by the remaining joint defense attorneys.' 8
The proposed per se rule prevents costly, damaging, and
disruptive case-by-case litigation of joint defense disqualifica-
tion motions.' 8 2 In successive and multiple representation situ-
ations, courts traditionally weigh the parties' competing
178. More precisely, a joint defense attorney would breach her limited fidu-
ciary duty to the former member by relying on confidential information to cross-
examine the former member. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion supra part I.E.
180. See supra notes 80-83.
181. Given that each joint defense member retains a separate attorney, the
government should rarely be able to prove this exception. See supra note 20
and accompanying text. Moreover, courts have traditionally presumed that
white collar criminal defendants understand the implications of their decisions
to retain a particular attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d
535, 572-74 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding waiver of Sixth Amendment rights knowing
and intelligent partly because defendant was a former prosecutor), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1004 (1989). This same presumption should apply to white collar de-
fendants who enter into a joint defense arrangement. Parties to a joint defense
arrangement can render this issue virtually moot by signing a formal joint de-
fense agreement that specifically indicates the possibility of cross-examination.
See supra note 69, 177 and accompanying text.
182. Federal courts should apply the proposed rule in all criminal cases.
The rule might appear overinclusive in the sense that its justification relies
significantly on the need to preserve adversarial fairness in complex, white col-
lar cases. But many other types of criminal cases litigated in federal court,
particularly large drug conspiracy prosecutions, present similar difficulties.
Furthermore, although the proposed rule is designed for complex cases, federal
courts should not have to determine whether a case is "sufficiently complex" to
warrant application of the proposed rule. In any event, as joint defense ar-
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interests under the facts of each particular case.18 3 When the
government seeks to disqualify on the basis of the joint defense
doctrine, however, the former joint defense member's interests
will never outweigh the defendant's interests, unless the defend-
ant has abused the doctrine or seeks to reveal specific joint de-
fense communications. This limitation on joint defense
disqualification removes any tactical advantage the government
might gain by using the disqualification motion against joint de-
fense arrangements.18 4 The proposed rule also saves the de-
fendant's financial resources and his attorney's reputation from
needless interference. 185
CONCLUSION
The integrity of the American system of criminal justice
rests on the fairness of its adversarial processes. The right to
counsel of choice and the joint defense doctrine both serve to
place the accused on the same playing field as the government.
Disqualification under the joint defense doctrine, however,
threatens the ability of defendants to effectively defend against
complex federal prosecutions. Courts, therefore, should limit
disqualification to those instances in which the defendants have
abused the joint defense doctrine, or when the defendant seeks
to reveal specific confidential communications. In all other
cases, disqualification under the joint defense doctrine is legally
unnecessary and unjust as a matter of policy.
rangements occur mainly in white collar or drug conspiracy prosecutions, the
impact of any overbreadth should be minimal.
183. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 150-151, 154 and accompanying text.
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